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 1 
Raymond Williams’s “structure of feeling” and the problem of democratic values in Britain,  
1938-1961 
 
The idea of a “structure of feeling” was first used by Raymond Williams in 1954 in a little-
read book entitled Preface to Film, the manifesto for a project upon which he was then 
collaborating with the screenwriter and producer Michael Orrom.1 When Williams abandoned 
the project in early 1957 he retained this portion of its intellectual capital, and deployed it in 
the works that established his public reputation over the following four years: Culture and 
Society (1958), and its quasi-sequel The Long Revolution (1961).2 During the subsequent five-
and-a-half decades it has formed part of the analytical vocabulary of some of the most 
innovative work in the humanities, particularly in literary scholarship that has developed the 
cultural materialism that Williams helped to pioneer, and in works of history that seek to 
elucidate the experience of subjects marginalised or excluded from traditional forms of inquiry. 
Almost immediately after Williams’s elaboration of the concept, it achieved the distinction of 
being disparaged and then adopted by E.P. Thompson in The Making of the English Working 
Class (1963), which helped to establish the practice of “history from below” in Britain.3 As 
historical inquiry in general has shifted away from causal explanation towards the 
reconstruction of experience and sentiment, the “structure of feeling” has frequently served to 
                                               
1 Raymond Williams, “Film and the Dramatic Tradition,” in Williams and Michael Orrom, Preface to Film 
(London, 1954). 
2 Raymond Williams, Culture and Society: 1780-1950 (London, 1958); id., The Long Revolution (London, 1961). 
3  E.P. Thompson, “The Long Revolution,” New Left Review I/9 (May-Jun. 1961), 29, 32; id., “The Long 
Revolution—II”, New Left Review I/10 (Jul.-Aug. 1961), 37; id., The Making of the English Working Class 
(London, 1963), 116, 194.  
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connect subjectivity to broader social and material processes.4 It has also been adopted by 
scholars following the more recent “affective turn” in the humanities, either as an analytical 
tool in its own right or as a pioneering step towards the development of a now densely-
constructed theoretical framework.5  
 Despite its widespread usage over nearly six decades of scholarly production, however, 
this “notoriously difficult” concept, as one study of Williams has described it, remains 
enigmatic.6 The secondary literature that has accumulated around Williams’s work since his 
death in 1988 has interpreted the “structure of feeling” in widely divergent ways. Williams’s 
first biographer alone offered three subtly different definitions of the term; and in one early 
critical survey of Williams’s work it was read, variously, as cognate with “ideology” and as an 
affective counterpart to Michel Foucault’s “epistème”.7 One recent attempt to elucidate it notes 
the confusion that the term occasions, yet shows greater certainty as to why its critics are 
                                               
4 For a particularly notable example, see Carolyn Steedman, Landscape for a Good Woman (London, 1986); more 
recently, Mark Salber Phillips, “On the Advantages and Disadvantages of Sentimental History for Life,” History 
Workshop Journal 65 (2008). 
5 See esp. Vanessa Agnew, “History’s Affective Turn: Historical reenactment and its work in the present,” 
Rethinking History 11 (2007); Gregory J. Seigworth and Melissa Gregg, “An Inventory of Shimmers,” in Gregg 
and Seigworth, eds., The Affect Theory Reader (Durham, N.C. and London, 2010); and Devika Sharma and 
Frederik Tygstrup, eds., Structures of Feeling: Affectivity and the Study of Culture (Berlin/ Boston, Mass., 2015), 
1-8. 
6 Paul Jones, Raymond Williams’s Sociology of Culture: A Critical Reconstruction (Basingstoke, 2004), 20.  
7 David Simpson, “Raymond Williams: Feeling for Structures, Voicing ‘History’” in Christopher Prendergast, ed., 
Cultural Materialism: On Raymond Williams (London/ Minneapolis, 1995), 29-50 (quotation at 43); Morag 
Shiach, “A Gendered History of Cultural Categories”, ibid., 51-70 (quotation at 58); Fred Inglis, Raymond 
Williams (London, 1995), 158, 229, 292. 
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mistaken than as to its positive content.8 Williams himself, under interrogation from the editors 
of New Left Review in 1977, could offer “no simple answer, but perhaps some clarification”, 
in the course of which he was forced back again to a defensive acknowledgement of “the need 
to define the limits of the term.”9 Part of the difficulty posed by the concept arises from its 
deployment in different senses in different parts of Williams’s own work: a difficulty which is 
often circumvented by the historically unsatisfactory procedure of reading the most accessible 
definitions given by Williams himself, in The Long Revolution and Marxism and Literature 
(1977), as exegeses of its meaning across his entire oeuvre.10 The effect of this ambiguity is 
that a concept which has formed a substantial underpinning of some of the most influential and 
tendentious developments in literary and historical scholarship since the 1950s carries no 
precise commitments: it functions rather to signify, and to command assent to, a broad set of 
intellectual and, perhaps, political principles without specifying the basis for their validity. In 
particular, the assumption—which is by no means integral to the concept itself—that it 
provides access to the experience of marginalised or subordinate historical actors has 
constituted a way of making “the subaltern speak” that evades the problems which scholars 
working within a different philosophical framework have recognised in this type of 
procedure.11 
If a history of the “structure of feeling” therefore illuminates some of the major 
developments in academic practice since the 1960s, it also casts new light upon mid-century 
                                               
8 Paul Filmer, “Structures of feeling and socio-cultural formations: the significance of literature and experience 
to Raymond Williams’s sociology of culture,” British Journal of Sociology 54 (2003). 
9 Raymond Williams, Politics and Letters: Interviews with New Left Review (London, 1979), 160; 164. 
10 Williams, Long Revolution, 47-49, 293; id., Marxism and Literature (Oxford, 1977), 128-135. 
11 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Can the Subaltern Speak?” in Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg, eds., 
Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture (Urbana/ Chicago, Ill., 1988). 
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intellectual history. Williams’s first major works were interventions in debates over the place 
of moral values in democratic politics that that were a central feature of the “cultural Cold 
War”, but which had been a point of contention in Britain and elsewhere since at least the 
1930s. Williams himself is often identified as a champion of cultural democracy, in opposition 
or contradistinction to a dominant “paternalism” in mid-century Britain.12 This reading of 
Williams’s early work can appear plausible insofar as his avowed concern was indeed to 
challenge theories of minority culture through a transfer or redistribution of cultural authority, 
or of the means of cultural production. But although Williams himself frequently espoused 
democracy in something like this sense, and developed the “structure of feeling” as a means of 
realising it, the history of the latter concept demonstrates that this “democratic” impulse was 
constrained by Williams’s concern to extend the tradition of moral criticism of industrialism 
that he himself traced from the early nineteenth century; and by the difficulty he encountered 
in conceiving of any change or renewal of the values underpinning that tradition other than 
through the agency of artists and critics, who thus retained a privileged role in cultural 
production.13 In this respect, the theory of culture of which the “structure of feeling” was the 
central component did not succeed in redistributing cultural authority quite so radically as 
Williams intended, and exemplified the problematic relationship between democracy and 
normative prescription in mid-century intellectual history. 
This essay opens by examining a reconfiguration of public discussion of “culture” and 
its capacity to sustain democracy that began at the end of the 1930s and continued into the 
Second World War and the cultural Cold War, which constitutes the “context of refutation” 
                                               
12 See, notably, Francis Mulhern, Culture/ Metaculture (London/ New York, 2000), 73. 
13 Similar observations have also been made in Simpson, “Raymond Williams” 38-40; and Jones, Raymond 
Williams’s Sociology of Culture, 46. 
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within which the idea of the “structure of feeling” was developed.14 In the course of this 
historical reconstruction it becomes apparent that Williams’s work was shaped within a much 
more eclectic intellectual culture than conventional descriptions of him as a “left-Leavisite” 
tend to imply.15 In particular, I suggest that the heterogeneous intellectual formation of liberal 
anti-Communism, and the dissemination of certain forms of holism within the mid-century 
social sciences, helped to shape Williams’s signature concept and to limit the extent of the 
cultural “democratisation” that it could support. Whilst the diverse influences upon which 
Williams drew in his attempt to escape the polarities of the cultural Cold War underpinned a 
novel theory of universal cultural production, the difficulties to which they gave rise—
particularly in relation to the possibility of change in artistic and moral values—ultimately left 
him reliant upon the authority of the artist or intellectual. As a result, his work not only bore a 
closer resemblance to a modified theory of “minority culture” than is generally supposed, but 
also registered a fundamental weakening of the moral critique of capitalism of which Williams 
himself was a leading exponent, long before that tradition is generally thought to have fallen 




As Williams travelled to Cambridge to study English literature in October 1939, public 
discussion of culture in Britain was at a point of transition in which the political-intellectual 
                                               
14 The idea of a “context of refutation” is adopted from Stefan Collini, Liberalism and Sociology: L.T. Hobhouse 
and Political Argument in England 1880-1914 (Cambridge, 1979), 9. 
15 This term was coined, and applied to Williams, in Terry Eagleton, “Criticism and Politics: The Work of 
Raymond Williams,” New Left Review I/95 (Jan.-Feb. 1976), 20-21; more recently, see Christopher Hilliard, 
English as a Vocation: The Scrutiny Movement (Oxford, 2012), ch.5. 
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moment of “the Thirties” was being simultaneously constructed and consigned to the past.16 
The self-conscious concern of the politicised literary culture of the 1930s to articulate what one 
of its leading exponents called “a philosophy of life that would make them feel that they were 
participants in the social order, not fugitives or rebels” was publicly recanted during what has 
been called “the long 1939” after the Munich Conference, and literature in particular was 
withdrawn from its recent social and political entanglements.17 Auden himself personified this 
transition after his retreat to America at the beginning of 1939 itself, abandoning the boring 
meetings and complicity in murder that had been de rigueur during the Spanish Civil War to 
grapple with “Negation and despair” in a Fifty-Second Street dive.18 The day before war with 
Germany was declared in Britain, the writer and publisher John Lehmann observed that 
“[S]omewhere between the Munich sell-out of last September and the defeat of the Spanish 
Republicans early this year, a significant change began to develop in the attitude of the literary 
and artistic ‘Left.’ There are signs […] of a revulsion from all political platforms.”19 
 That recent intellectual fashion was supplanted by a conception of artistic and quotidian 
culture as spheres in which supposedly non-political “democratic values” would be preserved 
from both the exigencies of wartime mobilisation, and the broader pathologies of modernity of 
which the war was commonly seen as a manifestation. This mode of cultural thought had been 
present in progressive circles throughout the 1930s, notably in the left-liberal New Statesman 
                                               
16 The seminal account of this process is that given in Samuel Hynes, The Auden Generation: Literature and 
Politics in England in the 1930s (London, 1976), 382-94. 
17 Michael Roberts, “First and Second Impressions,” Poetry Review 23 (Jan.-Feb. 1932), 66, quoted in Hynes, 
Auden Generation, 74; Steve Ellis, British Writers and the Approach of World War II (Cambridge, 2015), 6-7. 
18 W.H. Auden, “Spain” (April 1937), in Selected Poems, ed. Edward Mendelson (London, 1979), 53-4; id., 
“September 1, 1939,” New Republic 100 (18 Oct. 1939), 297. 
19 John Lehmann, “The Halt and the Blind,” New Statesman 2 Sep. 1939, 349-50. 
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whose socialist politics had existed in an uneasy tension with the “Bloomsbury” affiliations of 
its art and literary pages.20 At the end of 1939 an important editorial in the magazine claimed 
that the greater facility with which “totalitarian” regimes managed “modern” economies would 
require democracies to adopt the same techniques during the war – but predicted that liberty 
could be sustained in quotidian culture.21 The same intellectual co-ordinates were followed in 
the famous celebrations of national culture that were penned amid the Battle of Britain and the 
Blitz during 1940-41. For example, George Orwell’s lyrical evocation of plebeian England in 
The Lion and the Unicorn (1941) presented quotidian culture as a kind of preservative of 
individual liberty, counterbalancing the economic collectivism that the successful prosecution 
of the war demanded.22 Orwell continued to weigh these conflicting priorities throughout the 
1940s, but as he gradually came to view totalitarianism as a generalised pathology of modernity 
rather than as a particular state form, he became more doubtful of the capacity of national 
culture to withstand its corrupting influences.23 As a result, the preservation of the democratic 
subject from totalitarianism was increasingly devolved upon the arts, which, with the values 
they ostensibly sustained, were consequently viewed in quasi-aestheticist terms as a sphere 
entirely apart from broader social processes.  
This repudiation of the characteristic assumptions of “the Thirties” had been led by 
Cyril Connolly, who presented the declaration of war in 1939 as an opportunity for artists to 
withdraw to “The Ivory Shelter” and shortly afterwards launched the journal Horizon as a 
                                               
20 Edward Hyams, The New Statesman: The history of the first fifty years, 1913-1963 (London, 1963), 164-167. 
21 “Progress and Anarchy,” New Statesman 16 Dec. 1939, 884-885. 
22 George Orwell, The Lion and the Unicorn: Socialism and the English Genius (1941) in Peter Davison (ed.), 
The Complete Works of George Orwell (20 vols.; London, 1997-1998), henceforth CWGO, XII, 394; 427. 
23 See for example George Orwell, “Looking Back on the Spanish War,” CWGO XIII, esp. 499, 504; id. [anon.], 
“Review of The Pub and the People by Mass-Observation,” CWGO XIV, 320-322. 
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haven for them.24 Orwell was among its more notable early contributors, and shortly after The 
Lion and the Unicorn appeared he also gave a radio talk on “Literature and Totalitarianism” in 
which the writer was upheld as the paragon of individualism because his (sic) existence qua 
writer was dependent upon an ability to withstand the encroachments of “community”.25 
Likewise, in February 1942 Horizon warned that “a country that is socializing itself” was one 
of several factors making “the existence of the great artist, the free personality, of the solitary 
smouldering creative figure […] more and more precarious”; and an oft-quoted editorial the 
following December complained of the baleful effects of state-led “culture-diffusion” upon the 
arts themselves.26 Elsewhere, in 1943 the Sunday Times’s music critic Ernest Newman broke 
off from a celebration of Berlioz, “the most individual composer in the whole history of 
music”,27 to launch an intemperate critique of the Workers’ Music Association and its president, 
the composer Alan Bush, for their socialised vision of the artist and support for state patronage 
of the arts.28 
Newman’s diatribe was directed against a quasi-Communist artistic and critical milieu 
that had survived “the long 1939”, and which over the course of the war established itself as 
the principal antagonist to the aesthetic politics diversely articulated by Orwell, Horizon and 
Newman. During the 1930s the philo-Communist journal Left Review had fostered a 
programme of writing, criticism and theoretical work in which the vogue for politically- and 
                                               
24 Cyril Connolly, “The Ivory Shelter,” New Statesman 7 Oct. 1939, 482-3; “Comment,” Horizon I:1 (Jan. 1940), 
5-6. 
25 George Orwell, “Literary Criticism IV: Literature and Totalitarianism,” CWGO XII, 501-506. 
26 “Comment,” Horizon V:26 (Feb. 1942), 74; ‘Comment’, Horizon VI:36 (Dec. 1942), 370-371. 
27 Ernest Newman, “The Case of Berlioz,” Sunday Times 28 Feb. 1943, 2. 
28 Id., “Music and Ideology,” Sunday Times 28 Mar. 1943, 2; “England, Our England!” Sunday Times 18 Apr. 
1943, 2.  
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socially-engaged art was assimilated to the democratic verities of the Popular Front. The 
journal had closed abruptly in 1938 but was succeeded first by the mimeographed journal 
Poetry and the People and, from 1941, by the slightly more lavishly-produced Our Time. The 
launch of Operation Barbarossa in June that year enabled the British Communist Party 
(C.P.G.B.) to lend its support to Britain’s war effort, and Our Time attempted to situate itself 
at the head of a “democratic” or “people’s culture” that it claimed was being revived through 
popularising initiatives such as the Council for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts and 
the London Philharmonic Orchestra, recently re-formed along co-operative lines under the 
auspices of its Communist former violist Thomas Russell.29 In this “people’s culture” the artist 
was held to exemplify not the autonomous individual celebrated by Orwell et al., but the 
socialised individuality that would underpin both the war effort itself and the subsequent work 
of reconstruction;30 and the state was conceived as the highest manifestation of “the whole 
people”, the role of which in the planning of culture was indispensably beneficent.31 
As this suggests, the Communism espoused by writers in Our Time was highly 
unorthodox and in certain respects closer to an idealist form of modern liberalism than to any 
identifiable Marxist canons. It greeted the end of the war with an editorial under the Arnoldian 
headline “culture and anarchy”, and its accounts of a democratic “people’s culture” continued 
                                               
29 See, for example, F.J. Brown, “Let the People Sing”, Our Time 1:10 (Jan. 1942), 27-29; “The People’s Orchestra 
is Building a People’s Theatre”, Our Time 2:5 (Aug. 1942), 18-19; “The Future of Our Time”, Our Time 2:6 (Oct. 
1942), 1-3; “Notes and Comments”, Our Time 2:13 (Jul. 1943), 1-2; F.D. Klingender, “The Massacre of the 
Innocents”, Our Time 3:9 (Apr. 1944), 18-19. 
30 “The Future of Our Time,” Our Time 2:6 (Oct. 1942), 1; 2. 
31 “The Price of Culture,” Our Time 3:1 (Aug. 1943), 2-3; Walter Hudd, “New Audiences for Old…,” Our Time 
3:2 (Sep. 1943), 15-18, here 16; “Editorial: 1944,” Our Time 3:6 (Jan. 1944), 1; “Editorial: Education,” Our Time 
3:7 (Feb. 1944), 1; Fernau Hall, “One Man’s Meat,” ibid., 16; “Notes and Comments: The Arts in Wartime,” Our 
Time 4:1 (Aug. 1944), 3. 
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to rely heavily on intellectual and artistic arbiters: an editorial manifesto in July 1943, for 
example, declared that “a people’s culture” could only emerge “from below, by the people, 
through the re-educated desires of the people.”32 Nonetheless, Our Time’s cultural politics 
transgressed the opposition that had been set up elsewhere between collectivism and culture, 
in various forms; and the journal’s promotion of Communism and of popular Russophilia 
helped to reinforce the equation that Orwell had drawn between collectivism and 
totalitarianism. The same was true of attempts by philo-Communist intellectuals to apply to 
wartime discussions of national culture the “purposive” social science for which John Dewey 
had called during the 1930s, among the most prominent of whom was the biologist C.H. 
Waddington. In 1941 he published a Pelican Special arguing that democracies suffered from a 
cultural conservatism incompatible with “modern methods of production” – which he 
unpejoratively called “totalitarian”.33 Britain therefore required a new set of generally-agreed 
“standards” according to which radical social reforms could be enacted; and Waddington 
identified the processes of biological and social evolution as the bases of a “criterion by which 
we can decide between advance and retreat” which, being factually-grounded, should 
command universal assent.34 This vulgar-pragmatist argument, which initiated a celebrated 
debate on “science and ethics” in Nature, aligned Waddington with other advocates of the 
extension of “planning” into the field of culture.35 The sociologist Karl Mannheim, for example, 
had called for democratic planning of both the economy and social values, so that the 
“consistent way of life […] without which modern society cannot survive” might be established 
                                               
32 ‘Notes and Comments’, Our Time 2:13 (Jul. 1943), 2 (emphasis added). 
33 C.H. Waddington, The Scientific Attitude (Harmondsworth, 1941), 18. 
34 Ibid., 87. 
35 C.H. Waddington, “The Relations between Science and Ethics,” Nature 148 (6 Sep. 1941), 270-274. 
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without the straightforward imposition of uniformity. 36  But as Mannheim found in his 
exchanges with T.S. Eliot and the British-Hungarian scientist Michael Polanyi in “the Moot”, 
an ecumenical Christian discussion group convened to discuss the application of religious 
values to issues of social reform, the question of how a purposive reconstruction of morality 
could be undertaken by democratic means was not easily resolvable in the mid-1940s:37 as Tim 
Rogan has recently described, when Mannheim’s proposals for state-directed moral reform 
were adopted by the sub-committee on educational reconstruction set up by R.A. Butler in 




Historians of the “cultural Cold War” have long drawn attention to the way in which its 
antagonists laid claim to the virtues evoked by “culture”, and extolled the artist as an exemplar 
of the subjective attributes required to withstand the corrupting influence of the other side.39 In 
Britain this mode of cultural politics was already established during the preceding conflict, and 
its structuring division was between opposing conceptions of the ideal political subject and 
their relationship to the state. The sensitivities that were therefore raised by public discussion 
                                               
36 Karl Mannheim, Diagnosis of Our Time: Wartime Essays of a Sociologist (London, 1943), ch.VII, here 111. 
37 See Roger Kojecky, T.S. Eliot’s Social Criticism (London, 1971), ch.IX; also Stefan Collini, Absent Minds: 
Intellectuals in Britain (Oxford, 2006), 316-322. 
38 Tim Rogan, The Moral Economists: R.H. Tawney, Karl Polanyi, E.P. Thompson, and the Critique of Capitalism 
(Princeton & Oxford, 2017), 123-127 (quotation at 125). 
39 David Caute, The Dancer Defects: The Struggle for Cultural Supremacy During the Cold War (Oxford, 2003), 
Introduction, esp. 3-5; Jamie Cohen-Cole, “The Creative American: Cold War Salons, Social Science, and the 
Cure for Modern Society,” Isis 100 (2009), 222, 242; Greg Barnhisel, Cold War Modernists: Art, Literature and 
American Cultural Diplomacy (New York, NY, 2015). 
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of the arts were signalled in J.M. Keynes’ announcement of the Arts Council’s foundation in 
July 1945, in which his teasing declaration that “State patronage of the arts has crept in” was 
immediately qualified by an emphasis that the new body did “not intend to socialise this side 
of social endeavour” and that the “individual and free, undisciplined, unregimented, 
uncontrolled” character of the artist would remain intact.40 The months immediately following 
victory in Europe also saw a resurgence of the anti-Communist cultural politics wherein any 
form of collective normative legislation was regarded as a precursor to totalitarianism. In the 
new journal Polemic (1945-47), to which Orwell was a leading contributor, this was reinforced 
with a vulgarised form of logical positivism, whose conception of value statements as 
fundamentally meaningless upheld a rigid fact/ value distinction and thus undermined the 
capacity of culture to sustain moral values.41 The philosopher A.J. Ayer, who had helped to 
disseminate logical positivism in Britain during the 1930s and who had also begun to 
popularise the existentialism of Sartre and Camus, conjoined the two anti-foundationalist 
philosophies in a celebrated essay for Polemic entitled “The Claims of Philosophy”, which 
concluded: “The question how men ought to live is one to which there is no authoritative 
answer. It has to be decided by each man for himself.”42 
This secular antinomianism, which permitted no qualification of the individual’s moral 
autonomy, was antipathetic to thinkers who sought to situate moral values in culture and thus 
to submit them to purposive reform, or “planning”. Waddington’s earlier argument for 
factually-grounded reform of moral standards had been immediately recognised as a rebuttal 
                                               
40 J.M. Keynes, “The Arts Council: its Policy and Hopes,” The Listener 12 Jul. 1945, 31.  
41 “Editorial,” Polemic 1 (n.d., but 1945), 4. Karl Popper had also invoked a distinction between “natural” and 
“normative” law in his anti-Communist tract The Open Society and its Enemies, Volume I: The Spell of Plato 
(London, 1945), ch.5. 
42 A.J. Ayer, “The Claims of Philosophy,” Polemic 7 (Mar. 1947), 33. 
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of logical positivism, and when the C.P.G.B. re-launched its quasi-academic journal The 
Modern Quarterly at the end of 1945 it identified the “fact/ value” distinction among its 
principal intellectual antipathies. 43  In the same issue, the scientist J.D. Bernal reiterated 
Waddington’s call for a purposive reform of morality in an essay which attracted a good deal 
of opprobrium, particularly for its declaration that moral values “based on excessive concern 
with individual rectitude need reorienting in the direction of social responsibility.”44 As the 
ensuing debates intensified, news emerged of an “ideological hardening” in the U.S.S.R. that 
had begun with the suppression of two literary journals and the official disgrace of the writers 
Anna Akhmatova and Mikhail Zoshchenko.45 The “Soviet Literary Controversy”, as it rapidly 
became known, gained attention in Britain in September 1946 while the exchanges between 
Polemic and The Modern Quarterly were at their most intense, and in which Our Time’s 
tortuous apologias for the Soviet regime failed to convince more moderate cultural 
commentators who identified themselves with the “Left”. 46  J.B. Priestley, formerly a 
sympathiser with Communist cultural projects, now affirmed that the artist “must of necessity 
[…] be something of an individualist and an anarchist”; and the former Communist fellow-
traveller Stephen Spender complained in the New Statesman that “the poet, driven out of his 
                                               
43 “Science and Ethics: A Symposium,” Times Literary Supplement 2137 (16 Jan. 1943), 34; “Editorial,” Modern 
Quarterly (N.S.) 1:1 (Dec. 1945), 2. 
44 J.D. Bernal, “Belief and Action,” Modern Quarterly 1:1 (Dec. 1945), 53-54. 
45 The term “ideological hardening” was used in the first New Statesman report of a change in domestic policy 
within the Soviet Union: “Russia Hardens,” New Statesman 21 Sep. 1946, 202. 
46 “Editorial,” Modern Quarterly 2:1 (Winter 1946-47); “Comment,” Horizon XIV:82 (Oct. 1946); “Notes and 
Comments,” Our Time 6:4 (Nov.1946), 75. 
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bourgeois ivory tower, is being chased through communal corridors and offices into a new kind 
of isolation amidst the machinery and slogans of the collective international world.”47  
In mid-1947 this formed the point of departure for a new journal launched by three 
recent Cambridge graduates with the title Politics and Letters, which urged that a resolution of 
the recent debate over the source and status of moral values be accomplished in “experience of 
literature and the arts. For in these the values which we must be concerned to preserve find 
their most actual and complete expression.”48 In other words, what it called the “dichotomy” 
between its titular categories could be bridged by a conception of art as a realm governed by 
standards with universal validity, but which were enkindled and sustained in individual 
experience.49 This was an overtly Arnoldian vision of culture’s universal moral remit: the 
“values” extolled by the editorial resided in “‘the best that has been thought and known in the 
world’” and their application to debates over economic and social planning, it was claimed, 
would resolve the opposition between the individual and objective social forms.50 In offering 
this resolution of the impasse in the debate over “values”, the three aspiring public moralists 
were mobilising onto the intellectual battlefield of the Cold War an account of the efficacy of 
literature derived from the Cambridge English teacher F.R. Leavis, under whom two of them—
Wolf Mankowitz and Clifford Collins—had studied. However, his categories and assumptions 
created a fundamental intellectual tension in the journal that was unresolved when it closed 
                                               
47 J.B. Priestley, The Arts Under Socialism: Being a lecture given to the Fabian Society with a postscript on What 
the Government Should do for the Arts Here and Now (London, 1947), 13; 8; Stephen Spender, “Horatio Hits 
Back,” New Statesman 12 Apr. 1947, 258. 
48 “For Continuity in Change,” Politics and Letters 1:1 (Summer 1947), 3.  
49 Ibid., 3. 
50 Ibid., 4. The phrase “The best that has been thought and known in the world” was derived from Matthew 
Arnold’s “Culture and Anarchy” (1869), where it was synonymous with “culture”: see Culture and Anarchy and 
other writings, ed. Stefan Collini (Cambridge, 1993), 79. 
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after only three issues. The values denoted by an Arnoldian concept of “culture” could not, by 
definition, reside in the experience of more than a minority of individuals; for the rest, they 
would appear as external moral and intellectual standards scarcely less alien and dominative 
than those for which Bernal had seemingly called in The Modern Quarterly. This tension was 
laid bare in T.S. Eliot’s Notes Towards the Definition of Culture (1948), which attempted to 
dispel visions of culture as an agent of democratic reconstruction by austerely stating its 
incompatibility with either democracy or equality.51 Eliot famously identified “culture” with 
“the whole way of life of a people” – but a whole comprising a rigid hierarchy in which the arts 
were reserved to the highest social group.52 Accordingly, he declared in a much-quoted passage, 
“culture” was inherently inegalitarian: the reader who wished to pursue equality as an 




Eliot thus re-drew the connection between artistic and quotidian culture that liberal anti-
Communism had sought to disallow, but he also tacitly confounded the attempt that Politics 
and Letters had made to situate universal values in art by pronouncing that “the best that has 
been thought and known in the world” could only be present in the experience of a minority. 
This was the difficulty to which the third member of the journal’s editorial triumvirate, 
Raymond Williams, addressed his first full-length works, in which he responded to the 
formative debates of the cultural Cold War by envisaging artistic and moral values arising in 
universal experience – but without thereby being corrupted as proponents of minority culture 
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feared they would be. In his first book he accordingly located standards of critical judgement 
in what he called “the structure of personal feelings of […] writers and readers.”54 Whilst 
acknowledging that at present this might merely reveal the “poverty and dissociation of feeling” 
among both groups, Williams nevertheless maintained that “Adequate standards will not be 
created or sustained unless they arise from groups to which all contribute and all accept.”55 His 
next work of socio-literary criticism pursued this concern through the critique of naturalism 
that would become a characteristic theme of his work over the following years, in which 
Williams presented art as a manifestation of the fundamental cohesion of “experience” within 
and between subjects – what he called “the pattern or structure of experience”.56 At this stage, 
however, Williams was unable to reconcile this function with the normative content that he 
still wished “culture” to carry: in the “community of sensibility” that he envisaged between 
artist and audience, a special role was reserved for the artist, and even the audience comprised 
only a “minority” because “The pressure of a mechanical environment […] which artists, and 
a few of like temper, reject only by conscious resistance and great labour” had resulted in a 
“lack of certain qualities of living, certain capacities for experience” among the population at 
large.57 
 These distinctive locutions point to the problems Williams encountered in attempting 
to escape a Leavisian theory of minority culture while working within its categories and 
assumptions. In an unpublished paper of the early 1950s Williams identified Marxism as “The 
principal and most challenging alternative to the various theories of minority culture”, but in 
print he was more disparaging, and in any case that tradition of cultural theory had fallen into 
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abeyance by the early 1950s, after the closure of Our Time in 1949 and the tightening of 
C.P.G.B. control over its successors.58 Instead Williams’s development of a non-minoritarian 
theory of culture depended upon two very different aspects of mid-century intellectual culture. 
The first of these was what he called, in an unpublished report of 1954, “developments within 
Literary Criticism and Philosophy which have produced a greater emphasis on Language”.59 
The “extension” of these developments to adult education had included “The analysis of certain 
key words and concepts in relation to particular periods, and the development of society” – 
which he himself had designed and delivered under the rubric of “Culture and Society” since 
the late 1940s.60 In July 1953 he published an extended study of “The Idea of Culture” itself, 
in which that term’s ambiguity in contemporary usage was explained in terms of its codification 
of three entwined strands of response to “the industrial revolution”.61 The effect of this analysis 
was to demonstrate that the antinomies of his own earlier attempts to develop a non-elitist 
theory of culture resulted from the historical development of the master-category itself: culture 
was by definition reserved to a minority, and antithetical to the working class.62 (At this stage 
Williams’s re-definition of culture did not register other antitheses which would later be 
identified in his own work: like many of the thinkers with and against whom he argued, he 
conceived the nation as the fundamental cultural unit, imposing a system of exclusions and 
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differences that were tacitly concealed by an espousal of universalism.)63 Williams’s essay 
therefore supplied the “Definition of Culture” that Eliot’s recent analysis had magisterially 
presupposed, by demonstrating that it was “the response of certain men, attached to certain 
values, in the face of change and the consequences of change.”64 In other words, values were 
indeed contingent but the manner in which “culture” came to be understood as the “ground for 
ultimate valuation” during the nineteenth century demonstrated that their force was not thus 
diminished.65 Indeed, the potency of the values inscribed in “culture” was derived precisely 
from their being not merely the formulation of “a series of isolated men or groups”—
individuals, as Ayer had imagined them, articulating evaluative principles that applied only to 
themselves—but being grounded in social life, arising from the “pressure of active or general 
life […] the total environment to which [“culture”] is one kind of response.”66 
In accounting for that process of response to a “total environment”—in other words, 
for the process whereby art could be conceived as the forum for collective normative 
legislation—Williams appears to have assimilated the holistic emphases of cultural sociology 
and anthropology that had attained wide currency in Britain by the mid-1940s. Looking back 
during the 1970s upon his post-war return to Cambridge, Williams recalled noticing the 
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prevalence of “an anthropological sense” of culture “which now, with increased American 
influence and with the parallel influence of such thinkers as Mannheim, was becoming 
naturalized.”67 The American influence was almost certainly the “Culture and Personality” 
school of anthropology that was popularised in Britain during the 1940s by Margaret Mead and 
Ruth Benedict.68 (In a course syllabus of 1950 Williams described Benedict’s Patterns of 
Culture as “so distinguished that it cannot wisely be omitted from an essential reading list” for 
literature students.)69 The most obvious respect in which Benedict and Mead’s “influence” 
could be conceived as “parallel” to that of Mannheim is in its assimilation of the holism that 
was prevalent in discussions of “culture” in the mid-century social sciences.70 Mannheim, 
whose work continued to be published and prominently discussed in his adoptive country after 
his early death in 1947, was best-known for his “sociology of knowledge” wherein intellectual 
and cultural artefacts were conceived as products of the entire social order within which they 
emerged – an approach explained by E.H. Carr in an extended survey of his work in the Times 
Literary Supplement in 1953.71 In particular, Mannheim held that a sociological analysis of the 
political ideologies that claimed to make good the absence of coherent values in contemporary 
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societies would enable them to be understood as “structures” or “styles of thought”, among 
which a latent cohesion could be perceived by the sociologist of knowledge.72 In his most 
influential work, Ideology and Utopia (1929, trans. 1936) Mannheim had termed this method 
“relationism” and presented it as a sociological application of Gestalt psychology derived from 
the work of Alfred Weber, with whom he had studied at Heidelberg.73 During the mid-1940s 
Mannheim’s work was prominently criticised by both Friedrich von Hayek and Karl Popper – 
in the latter case, expressly on the grounds of what Popper took to be its mis-application of 
Gestalt-ist holism (with its then-famous understanding of perceptual “wholes” that were 
distinct both from their component parts and from the aggregate of the parts – yet were 
emphatically non-idealist).74 Williams’s attention may also have been drawn to Mannheim by 
his wife (who was a student at the London School of Economics during 1937-40, while 
Mannheim was lecturing there); a syllabus he prepared for a W.E.A. course on “Culture and 
Society” in 1950-51 included Mannheim’s Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction (1940) 
among the assigned reading.75 
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 Williams’s formal elaboration of the process whereby values arose as a response to a 
“total environment” appears to have responded to the distinctive mode of analysis that 
Mannheim had dubbed “relationism”. As we have seen, in 1954 he co-authored the manifesto 
for a film project to which he contributed a prefatory essay on “Film and the Dramatic 
Tradition”, in which film was presented as par excellence the medium in which the deficiencies 
of naturalist drama could be overcome. Here Williams presented the dual meaning of 
“convention” as evidence of the inherently social and consensual nature of “accepted 
standards”.76 The success of dramatic performance, Williams claimed, depended upon its 
accordance with artistic “convention”, which meant “the terms upon which author, performers 
and audience agree to meet”. 77  The artist was always constrained by this need for the 
audience’s prior consent to his methods and technique: Williams emphasised that “we shall not 
be able, merely by taking thought, to create an alternative convention” because “Dramatist, 
actors and audience must be able to agree that the particular method to be employed is 
acceptable”. 78  In other words, the operation of artistic “conventions” demonstrated that 
meaningful standards or values could never be determined by individual artists, but were the 
outcome of an interaction between the arts and “the life of the time in which they flourished” 
– which Williams here named “the structure of feeling”.79 
 The invention of this category as the primary field of artistic creation enabled Williams 
to interpose a theory of socially-generated value between the overt antinomianism of liberal 
anti-Communism, and the equally overt elitism of Eliot’s recent attempt to conjoin social and 
artistic values. The Mannheimian “structure” or “style of thought” was here transposed into the 
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realm of “feeling” to denote a latent cohesion that was always, already present beneath the 
apparent fragmentation of contemporary values. “All the products of a community in a given 
period are, we now commonly believe, essentially related”, Williams explained, “although in 
practice, and in detail, this is not always easy to see.”80 This “essentially related” quality, and 
the fundamental cultural cohesion it supposedly underwrote, was obscured by criticism that 
focused upon determinate aspects of social life, as naturalist drama focused upon character and 
personality instead of the whole: 
 
We examine each element as a precipitate, but in the living experience of the time every 
element was in solution, an inseparable part of a complex whole […] when one has 
measured the work against the separable parts, there yet remains some element for 
which there is no external counterpart. This element, I believe, is what I have named 
the structure of feeling of a period, and it is only realizable through experience of the 
work of art itself, as a whole.81 
 
The “structure of feeling” was therefore the distinctive quality of a “complex whole” that was 
not present in its individual parts, or in their aggregate: it was homologous with the principle 
of cohesion in cultural formations that Mannheim, in particular, had elaborated. The 
relationship that Williams thus established between artistic and anthropological culture 
differed from that envisaged by Eliot insofar as it precluded, by definition as it were, the 
reservation of the arts to any particular social group: Williams identified them with the whole 
because they embodied standards subsisting in a “structure of feeling” that was itself composed 
of the relations between all “the separable parts” of a universal culture. The elucidation of those 
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relations—of the “structure of feeling”—remained the task of the artist, but it was now 
ostensibly a secondary activity, the articulation of principles which all members of society were 
always engaged upon creating. In the arts, “A new convention […] will become established 
because there are changes in the structure of feeling which demand expression”.82 Whereas 
Politics and Letters had envisaged Arnoldian “culture” as instilling values into experience in 
order to reconcile the individual with objective social processes, Williams understood art as an 
expression of values that already pervaded individual and social experience. “The structure of 
feeling”, he emphasised in conclusion, “lies deeply embedded in our lives; it cannot be merely 
extracted and summarized; it is perhaps only in art—and this is the importance of art—that it 
can be realized, and communicated, as a whole experience.”83 Although comparatively little-
noticed in 1954, Williams thus elaborated a theoretical framework within which culture as an 
ordered body of work and judgements could be restored to what he thought of as a universal 
social constituency, and in so doing established the means by which he would attempt to 





The theory of culture that Williams outlined in these early works was a product both of the 
“cultural Cold War”, and of the moment in twentieth-century Britain that Harold Perkin 
famously characterised as “the plateau of professional society”, during which competing claims 
to public authority were made by various forms of expertise, on the grounds of distinctive or 
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unique disciplinary competence.84  Literary intellectuals were vigorous participants in this 
contestation of public authority during the 1950s and 1960s.85 As we have seen, Politics and 
Letters had already claimed a unique public authority for literature amid the scientistic debate 
over “values” during the mid-1940s; and Williams presented Reading and Criticism as an 
extension of the Leavisian tradition of “culture and environment” studies that explicitly 
emphasised the efficacy of literature in the formation and maintenance of liberal subjectivity.86 
In this Williams was one of a group of young writers influenced by Leavis in the mid-1950s 
who upheld the capacity of literature to disclose ameliorative knowledge of the social, 
particularly in contradistinction to what were taken to be quasi-positivistic modes of 
sociological or philosophical knowledge. E.P. Thompson’s biography of William Morris (1955) 
projected anti-Communist deployments of logical-positivism back onto early Victorian 
industrialism, demonstrating how the Gradgrindian mantra of “‘Fact, fact, fact […] fact, fact, 
fact’”, which nullified all “values” besides those of the existing economic and social order, was 
made to yield to the articulated moral principle of Morris’s aesthetic politics.87 The opening of 
Richard Hoggart’s famous study of working-class and mass culture The Uses of Literacy (1957) 
dismissed “the detailed studies of working-class life which sociologists have made over the 
last twenty years”, and underlined the special ability of literary analysis to decode cultures – 
“to see beyond the habits to what the habits stand for, to see through the statements to what the 
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statements really mean […] to detect the differing pressures of emotion behind idiomatic 
phrases and ritualistic observances.”88 
Williams likewise claimed a special role for the writer and critic as legislators of social 
values in his emphatic statement that “it is perhaps only in art” that the structure of feeling “can 
be realized, and communicated, as a whole experience”. This emphasis became more 
pronounced as Williams attempted to demonstrate how change in the “structure of feeling” 
could take place: the extent to which his new category had diminished the role of the artist in 
cultural production seemingly foreclosed the possibility of any deliberate innovation in artistic 
and moral standards, and Williams attempted to rectify this by suggesting that changes in 
conventions originated in the structure of feeling, but were initially perceptible to “a few minds 
only” who would “promote and affect them.”89 In other words it continued to be necessary to 
assign some measure of authority to a minority, which thus remained a spectral presence in his 
theory of universal cultural production. But Williams’s overriding concern to dispel this 
presence subsequently led him to dispense altogether with any mediation between “experience” 
and “culture” so that, as he explained in an oft-cited essay of 1958, “Culture is Ordinary” – it 
was composed of the “shape”, the “purposes” and “meanings” of an entire society, which were 
“also made and remade in every individual mind.”90 In the same year, in his celebrated book 
Culture and Society Williams unified the two strands of criticism that he had adumbrated in 
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the essays of 1953-54: the “tradition” of thought about culture that he had identified in 1953 
was presented here as the articulation of a “structure of feeling” which culminated in the 
contemporary figure of Orwell, whose work demonstrated the breakdown of the traditional 
concept of “culture” in the intellectual and social conjuncture of the early 1950s.91  
Williams claimed that there was now a dislocation between “immediate experience” 
and the “meanings” conveyed by the tradition, which it was his aim to overcome – but not, it 
appeared, through any conscious action.92 In comparison with thinkers working within the 
ambit of the Communist Party, Williams was little-concerned with the possibility of purposive 
historical change: he appears closer to what has been characterised as a liberal-communitarian 
response to modernity, wherein an instinctive valuation of “a densely structured traditional 
existence” leaves “no point of leverage for criticism.”93 The conclusion to Culture and Society 
stated that any attempt at deliberate alteration of the structure of feeling was a manifestation of 
“the dominative attitude” or “mode”,94 in contrast to which Williams demanded a “democratic 
practice” centring upon the recognition that “Nobody can raise anybody else’s cultural standard. 
The most that can be done is to transmit the skills, which are not personal but general human 
property, and at the same time to give open access to all that has been made and done.”95 The 
Arnoldian treasury of “the best that has been thought and known” was here recast in more 
inclusive terms as “all that has been made and done”, and Williams attempted to demonstrate 
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how working-class institutions could supply a new “structure of feeling” that would supplant 
the tradition of “culture” that had exhausted itself in the 1950s. “[T]he basic collective idea” 
embodied in working-class institutions was accordingly set in a quasi-dialectical relationship 
with “the basic individualist idea” of “bourgeois culture”, and Williams claimed that “In our 
culture as a whole, there is both a constant interaction between these ways of life and an area 
which can properly be described as common to or underlying both.”96 This did not overcome 
the fundamental problem posed by his theory of universal cultural and ethical legislation, 
however: the retained concept of the “culture as a whole” within which working-class and 
bourgeois cultures supposedly commingled suggested that the former had already been 
synthesised into the extant “structure of feeling” and its articulated “meanings”, rather than 
forming the basis of a new, future synthesis in the way that Williams’s application of his 
historical analysis to contemporary debates about “culture” seemed to require. 
Culture and Society became one of the seminal texts of the “New Left” that began to 
emerge in Britain in the late 1950s, seemingly in response to de-Stalinisation in the U.S.S.R., 
Soviet repression of the Hungarian revolt in October that year, and the almost-
contemporaneous Suez affair; and as a forum for attempts by young intellectuals to reformulate 
socialist theory in response to the altered structures of post-war capitalism.97 In fact most of 
the New Left’s distinctive concerns—with “commitment” in the arts, with the relationship 
between socialism and “humanism”, with the politics of logical positivism and Oxford ordinary 
language philosophy, and with the constraints of Popperian and structural-functionalist social 
science—were continuations of debates that had been underway for most of the post-war period, 
and in which competing disciplinary claims to public authority were clearly registered. It is 
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therefore unsurprising that Williams’s book, the culmination of his attempt to escape the 
intellectual deadlock that he perceived in the debates of the mid-1940s, should have gained so 
much attention in this milieu, which also shared his positive valuation of “democracy”. The 
inaugural editorial of Universities and Left Review, one of the constitutive journals of the new 
intellectual caucus, declared that its principal difficulty was to renew what the journal called 
“socialist values” in such a way as to “change contemporary society so as to make it more 
democratic and more egalitarian, and yet […] prevent it degenerating into totalitarianism” – an 
extraordinary qualification which is suggestive of how far schemes of moral and cultural 
reform such as those advocated by the incipient “New Left” had been placed in tension with 
democracy during the debates of the 1940s.98 The historian E.P. Thompson joined Williams as 
one of the dominating figures of the New Left through his editorship of the New Reasoner, and 
by supplying a distinctive theoretical framework for its pursuit of democracy in his vision of 
“socialist humanism”, a kind of corporate self-government that he counterposed to the 
bureaucratism of Soviet Communism and to the weaknesses and evasions of social-democratic 
politics.99 
In practice, however, the “agency” that stood at the centre of this renewal of democracy 
was a corporate faculty wherein working-class experience would be harnessed to the theoretical 
productions of socialist intellectuals.100 This emphasis on intellectual leadership was retained 
in Williams’s own work for the New Left, despite his attempts to dispense with it in Culture 
and Society. In an essay for Universities and Left Review in 1958, Williams presented the realist 
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novel as the sole remedy for the conflict between “meanings” and “experience” that he had 
diagnosed in that book, contra the claims of “sociology on the one hand or psychology on the 
other”: in fact his hopes were vested in a particular kind of realist novel, closely resembling 
the one he himself was engaged upon writing.101 Williams’s parallel attempts during the late 
1950s to develop the formal theory of culture foreshadowed in Culture and Society seem to 
have encountered their greatest difficulty in establishing how the “structure of feeling” could 
mediate between culture and society without any delegation of cultural production or authority 
to intellectuals. His notebooks from mid-1957 contain outlines for “a general theory” of culture 
in which the different senses of that term and their relationship to “society” are painstakingly 
elaborated, with the “structure of feeling” interposed as a “middle term” which bound 
individuals to culture by demonstrating that they were always tacitly engaged upon its 
construction.102 This redefinition of the concept as a mediation of individual creativity appears 
as an attempt to resolve the problem of universalised cultural production that had arisen in 
Culture and Society, by understanding it not as a properly collective process but as one engaged 
upon simultaneously and autonomously by (all) individuals. He still appears to have been 
uncertain whether the “structure of feeling” was the object of expression, or its medium; in a 
sequence of notes on “Art and Mind” it is presented as both: 
 
 Expresses what? : The structure of feeling. 
 Because expresses : communicates. 
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This is why the structure is necessary, [formulas?] and forms for communication: 
partic. channels into which personal energies & conflicts can be diverted, & through 
exercise, partially controlled.103 
 
In 1961 the “general theory” of culture for which these notes were a preparation 
appeared as The Long Revolution, in which the diagnosis advanced in Culture and Society was 
elaborated in greater detail. At the turn of the 1960s, Williams claimed, Britain had seen the 
ascendancy of the liberal-empiricist ideology of which he had formerly identified Orwell as 
the representative, wherein the reality of social ties outside the immediate circle of “family and 
friends” was denied.104 It was thus a “mass” society, in the sense that the corollary of this mode 
of individualism was an “image of society” wherein other people were viewed as “the mass” – 
and, implicitly, “governed, organized, instructed and entertained by an élite or élites.”105 
(Williams also described this “image of society” in quasi-Mannheimian terms as a “structure 
of thinking”.)106 This mode of individualism was self-contradictory, however, since on its own 
terms it must either recognise the validity of other individuals, and thus concede some measure 
of social reciprocity; or culminate in the individual’s own subsumption by the mass.107 It was 
also confounded by the very nature of experience, which the “structure of feeling” was intended 
to render inherently social: as we saw, Williams’s notes for the book indicate how he wished 
to use this “central concept” to bind individuals to “culture” by demonstrating that they were 
always tacitly engaged upon its construction. The Long Revolution opened with a 
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reinforcement of that argument using the neuroscientist J.Z. Young’s recent Reith lectures, 
which Williams cited as definitive validation of his belief that creativity was a universal faculty 
exercised at all times, by the mere fact of consciousness.108 He now inverted the claim he had 
made in 1958, that “Culture is Ordinary”: Young’s lectures, he claimed, demonstrated that 
“there are, essentially, no ‘ordinary’ activities, if by ‘ordinary’ we mean the absence of creative 
interpretation and effort. Art is ratified, in the end, by the ratification of creativity in all our 
living.”109 
The dominant “image of society” in Britain was therefore, by definition, at odds with 
“experience” because the latter category did not admit of any distinction between elites and 
masses. In this sense Williams attempted to demonstrate how the three components of his “long 
revolution”—democratic, industrial, and cultural—were intertwined, and mutually inextricable: 
in effect, how processes of economic, social and cultural development were evincing and 
promoting a universal impulse towards self-government.110 He also redefined the “structure of 
feeling” in accordance with his modified theoretical framework, placing more emphasis upon 
the intangible qualities that resided in “a way of thinking and living” of which there was no 
formal record or artefact: it was “a particular sense of life, a particular community of experience 
hardly needing expression, through which the characteristics of our way of life that an external 
analyst could describe are in some way passed, giving them a particular and characteristic 
colour.”111 In this sense the structure of feeling was actually inscrutable even to the individuals 
who were present within it; but it could be approached through “the body of intellectual or 
imaginative work, in which, in a detailed way, human thought and experience are variously 
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recorded”.112 Williams claimed, in accordance with his quasi-democratic theory of universal 
creativity, that this encompassed all the artefacts of a culture, “from poems to buildings and 
dress-fashions”,113 and proceeded to apply the reformed concept to an analysis of English 
culture during the 1840s in which he claimed that even novelists who opposed the dominant 
“social character” remained inescapably “bound by the structure of feeling.”114 
There was, however, an exception. In Wuthering Heights, “The creative elements in the 
other fiction are raised to a wholeness which takes the work right outside the ordinary structure 
of feeling, and teaches a new feeling.”115 The problem that Williams had always recognised in 
his “central concept”, of how it could allow for innovation and change, was ultimately 
irresolvable without recourse to the tutelary role of the artist (in this case Emily Brontë). He 
was therefore constrained to assign a special status to “art” that set it apart from the more 
quotidian forms of creativity with which he had attempted to equate it: “Art reflects its society 
and works a social character through to its reality in experience. But also, art creates, by new 
perceptions and responses, elements which the society, as such, is not able to realize.”116 
Although he insisted on the “deep and central connections” between art and “the rest of the 
general life”, the possibility of artistic and ethical change ultimately required that those 
connections should not be reciprocal but run from one to the other, and the artist was again 
accorded the authority as cultural producer and legislator that it had been Williams’s foremost 
purpose to disperse.117 Accordingly at the close of the second section of the book, Williams 
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tacitly modified the theory of universal creativity that he had outlined at its opening: “Reality 
is continually established, by common effort, and art is one of the highest forms of this 
process.”118 In calling for “a new realism” in the novel that would transcend the contemporary 
“structure of feeling”, Williams was therefore arguing for the special role of the artist as the 
legislator of a new way of life.119 If Britain in 1961 was indeed in the midst of a “long 
revolution” of the kind that he had claimed, the constraint of his own theoretical work within 





The ambivalences and ambiguities that were therefore evident in The Long Revolution were 
also registered in wider attempts to reassert the role of moral values in political and economic 
debate in Britain during the early 1960s. In disputes within the Labour Party from the late 
1950s, the new concept of “affluence”—partially derived from J.K. Galbraith’s The Affluent 
Society (1958)—was harnessed to a moral critique of the impoverishment of the public sphere 
that resulted from treating economic growth and consumption as ends in themselves.120 Around 
the same time there was a minor revival of interest in R.H. Tawney, whose works of the 1920s 
and 1930s inspired some of those moralistic usages of “affluence”.121 On Tawney’s death in 
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January 1962, a New Statesman editorial explicitly situated contemporary critiques of 
capitalism in the lineages of Tawney’s ethical socialism: “He had never claimed that capitalism 
was unworkable […] He believed, quite simply, that it was wrong”, the paper explained: 
 
Long before J.K. Galbraith reminded us of the contrast between private affluence and 
public squalor, Tawney had attacked the double standard of private and public morality. 
Both The Acquisitive Society and Equality are passionate assertions that man cannot be 
whole or dignified until he lives in a community where his private motives lead him to 
seek the public good.122 
 
Yet although this moralistic rhetoric was integrated into Labour Party policy statements during 
the early 1960s and into the “public doctrine” that Harold Wilson elaborated as Labour leader 
during 1963-4, it did not shift the fundamental priorities of Labour policy. Shortly after 
Labour’s return to office in the 1964 election Williams himself acknowledged that, within the 
party itself, the tradition of “moral critique” that subsisted in working-class culture and in the 
literary tradition he had analysed in Culture and Society had long been subordinate to the 
utilitarian and paternalist ideology of Fabianism, and would likely remain so under Wilson.123 
 It has recently been argued that a version of this tradition of anti-utilitarian moral 
criticism, stemming from Tawney, was invalidated amid the anti-humanist shift in Western 
intellectual life from the late 1960s because it had depended upon a notion of the human 
“personality” as an absolute end in itself. 124  While that development was undoubtedly 
influential, we have seen here that the place of moral values in political debate had already 
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become deeply problematic by the 1940s, when the compatibility of any form of normative 
legislation with democracy and liberty was called into question in fundamental terms. The 
complexities and contradictions of Williams’s concept of the “structure of feeling” arose from 
his attempts to circumvent those difficulties. Exponents of this kind of moral criticism were 
therefore already in a defensive position by the early 1950s, as a consequence not of challenges 
to the normative validity of the human “personality” but of a dominant intellectual liberalism 
that sought a safeguard against totalitarianism in a tendentious equation of individual liberty 
with value pluralism.125 The philosopher Richard Wollheim directly applied this criticism to 
Williams’s theory of culture shortly after The Long Revolution appeared, counterposing his 
own conception of Socialism as “a culturally plural society” to Williams’s idea of a “common 
culture” which, in its apparent requirement for “widespread acceptance of […] substantive 
values”, risked allowing “the modest ideal of a society in which people speak the same 
language” to be supplanted by “the more comprehensive ideal of a society in which people say 
roughly the same things” – a criticism which evinces the same pattern of response that was 
apparent in ULR’s recognition that its espousal of democracy should not be permitted to slide 
into “totalitarianism”.126 
The alarming implications that this criticism raised demonstrate the sensitivities that 
had formed around holistic or unitary schemes of moral reform by the early 1960s, as a result 
of the debates over the relationship between democracy and values that have been examined in 
this essay. Williams elaborated the concept of the “structure of feeling” in an attempt to develop 
a theory of culture that would licence a democratisation of cultural production, while 
continuing to support the progressive historical developments that he referred to as “the Long 
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Revolution”. Yet the difficulty of sustaining a thoroughgoing cultural democracy had already 
been recognised by Karl Mannheim in his essay “The Democratization of Culture” (1933), 
which appeared in English in 1956 in a collection that Williams listed in the bibliography to 
The Long Revolution.127 Mannheim viewed cultural democratisation as the normative path of 
development in modern societies, but also acknowledged “an inner contradiction inherent in 
the democratic organization of society” – namely, its irreconcilability with the objective of 
order. 128  “Hence, all democratic societies need certain neutralizing devices involving 
undemocratic or anti-democratic potentialities”, he explained: “These devices, however, are 
not imposed upon democratic society from without; they consist essentially in a voluntary 
renunciation by the mass of the full use of its energies.”129 As we have seen, Mannheim was 
strongly criticised for his abrogation of democracy, and even after his death T.S. Eliot 
wondered at what he called Mannheim’s “dual personality”, in a letter to the theologian 
Reinhold Niebuhr of 1953: “ I mean, that he always seemed to me to have the heart of a humane 
and highly civilised liberal and the head of a totalitarian planner”.130 Williams, of course, 
sought to avoid any voluntary renunciation of cultural self-government and attempted instead 
to construct a theoretical framework within which what Mannheim called “the mass” could 
make full use of its creative faculties – but in which order, or the operation of cultural standards, 
could only be secured by the regulatory and innovative function of artists and intellectuals. His 
work, too, could thus appear to contemporaries to embody a dualism. “There are really two 
                                               
127 Karl Mannheim, “The Democratization of Culture” in Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Culture (London, 
1956); Williams, Long Revolution, 357. 
128 Mannheim, “The Democratization of Culture”, 178. 
129 Ibid., 178-9 (emphasis in original). 
130 Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C., Papers of Reinhold Niebuhr, box 5, letter to 
Niebuhr from T.S. Eliot dated 19th August 1953. 
 37 
Raymond Williamses”, a reviewer in the New Statesman observed in 1962: “The first is a 
democrat”, while the second “half-subscribes to the romantic myth that the modern world has 
seen some kind of absolute deterioration in the quality of life […] this is the Raymond Williams 
who has been attracted by Coleridge’s dream of a clerisy.”131 
The perception that Williams risked being absorbed into the tradition he himself had 
traced in Culture and Society was also, half-jokingly, raised by E.P. Thompson amid their 
uneasy collaboration within the first New Left.132 However, Williams himself had presented 
that book as part of the completion of “a body of work which I set myself to do ten years 
ago”,133 and his growing engagement with what would later be called western Marxism was 
already evident in his article on Wilson for New Left Review: the contrast here between a 
potentially transformative moral critique and the corporatism of Fabian socialism, and the 
emphasis upon the political agency of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the New 
Left, demonstrated affinities with the work of Antonio Gramsci, which had long been known 
among British socialists before being adopted as an explicit theoretical reference point by Perry 
Anderson and Tom Nairn.134 With the fuller development of Williams’s cultural materialism 
during the 1970s, he attempted to reformulate the “structure of feeling” in quasi-Marxian terms: 
 
The idea of a structure of feeling can be specifically related to the evidence of forms 
and conventions—semantic figures—which, in art and literature, are often among the 
very first indications that such a new structure is forming […] as a matter of cultural 
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theory this is a way of defining forms and conventions in art and literature as inalienable 
elements of a social material process[.]135 
 
The voluntarism that Williams had attempted to incorporate in his earliest elaborations of the 
concept receded in this re-definition, with neither artist nor audience credited with any special 
agency in the face of “a social material process” that appears more nearly determinative than 
Williams allowed in his work of the 1950s. This shift may reflect his recognition of the 
problems that the concept continued to raise, which he explicitly acknowledged in his 
interviews with New Left Review shortly afterwards; but it also demonstrates how strongly 
Williams’s earlier work had been formed by the acute intellectual pressures of the 1940s and 
1950s, a context by which it was less strongly bound by the mid-1970s. 
Nonetheless, insofar as that passage in mid-century intellectual history saw purposive 
attempts to invalidate moral argument in political and economic discourse, and the valorisation 
of an ostensible ethical neutrality characteristic of early or “first-phase” neoliberalism, its 
influence continues to be felt in the present day.136 Calls for the restoration of moral critique to 
contemporary debates about capitalism will therefore have not only to circumvent the problems 
posed by the concept of the human “personality”, but also address the difficulties of reconciling 
moral prescription with democracy that this essay has suggested was a major issue in mid-
century intellectual history, and the fundamental concern of Williams’s early work. The history 
traced here suggests that those difficulties are not insuperable: as has been pointed out 
elsewhere, “views cast in a negative form” such as the disallowance of moral prescription, 
“may not be, in any given situation, any less prescriptive than views cast in a positive form”; 
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and democracy is not necessarily or obviously incompatible with all forms of intellectual and 
cultural hierarchy. 137  It was made so, however, in Williams’s rejection of any form of 
normative legislation as a manifestation of “the dominative mode”, which also anticipated the 
radically anti-hierarchical impulses that were unleased among the European and American left 
from the late 1960s. These, too, foundered upon their aversion to political leadership, while 
arguably lending themselves to new and more insidious forms of domination.138 Some of the 
most influential recent work in modern intellectual history has been concerned with delineating 
a contemporary account of “the origins of the present crisis”, in the celebrated phrase associated 
with Williams’s interlocutors on the second New Left, by pointing to the unintended 
consequences of intellectual transformations that were accomplished in the global conjuncture 
of the late 1960s and early 1970s.139 If the effects of those transformations are to be undone or 
overcome, their lineages within a more extended intellectual history of the kind that this article 
has attempted to outline will need to be more fully understood; and Williams’s attempts to 
diagnose and respond to the intellectual convulsions of the mid-twentieth century may 
therefore retain some significance beyond the academy in the early twenty-first. 
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